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The Contribution of the State of Qatar to the Syrian

Displaced Population: A Case Study of the Syrian Forced

Migrants in Qatar

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ABSTRACT

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Title: The Contribution of the State of Qatar to the Syrian Displaced Population: A Case Study of the Syrian Forced Migrants in Qatar

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Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, roughly 5.6 million Syrians have fled the country as a result of the ongoing conflict in the region. Many of them have crossed into Gulf nations such as Qatar, even though this nation was not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. This study aims to explore the efforts made by the Qatari government to improve the situation of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar as well as refugees elsewhere. Interviews were carried out with Syrians who entered Qatar since 2011, recording narratives of their experiences in the country. The findings revealed that visa status had a strong influence on whether the experiences of Syrian forced migrants were positive or negative, and suggest that the Qatari government should do more to ensure that the human rights of the Syrian forced migrants within its borders are upheld.

Key Terms: displacement; forced migrants; refugees

DEDICATION

To all those who were forced to leave their homelands.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter introduces various concepts that are instrumental for establishing a research framework. The chapter is divided into several sections, which are necessary to define the context as well as the scope of the research. These sections include background information behind to the Syrian migrant crisis as implied by the main topic of research, and the resulting problem statement. Other sections in the chapter include the main research questions that arise as a result of the presented problem statement, and the formulated hypothesis. The last two sections address the theoretical framework, which is essentially the main conceptual framework the study will use to address the questions, and, finally, the significance of this study.

1.1. Background of the Syrian Crisis

The conflict in Syria, which started in 2011 and pitted Bashar al-Assad's government against various forces, resulted in the displacement of millions of people within the country and into other countries within the region (Franklin, Cleveland and Guidi, 2015). At the end of 2014, reports estimated that a total of 7.6 million people in Syria were internally displaced and about 3.7 million others had fled the country (Ostrand, 2015). The conflict has not only resulted in the displacement of people, but it has also brought about the death of thousands of people and the destruction of essential infrastructure while contributing to a decline in the general living standards of the Syrian people.

An estimated 13.1 million Syrians are currently in need of humanitarian assistance (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). Schools, hospitals, healthcare centers, water and sanitation systems have all been destroyed as a result of the conflict. Marketplaces that were once busy, as well as historic sites, are now nothing more than rubble (Franklin et al., 2015). As a result of the conflict, the business and social ties that brought the Syrian people and those from neighboring countries together have been broken. Today, the Syrian crisis is described as the largest displacement and refugee crisis in modern times. The situation is indeed dire and has placed enormous strain on neighboring countries, including Qatar.

The Syrian refugee crisis has been described as the worst refugee crisis since World War II. In 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said that “Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time” (Grandi, 2016). He added that the crisis has been a major cause of suffering for millions of people, and urged nations around the world to take responsibility and address this crisis. According to Amnesty International (2014), 95% of all refugees from Syria fled primarily to five neighboring countries (Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon) in 2014. In Turkey, the population of Syrian refugees as of April 2018 stood at a staggering 3,577,752 (Data2.unhcr.org, 2018). Other nations that hosted a majority of the Syrian refugee population included Lebanon at 976,002, Jordan at 671,919, Iraq at 250,184, Egypt at 131, 019 and other Northern African nations at 33,545 (Data2.unhcr.org, 2018). Since the conflict erupted in Syria in 2011, more than 200,000 people have been killed and scores of others inside the country are in urgent need of humanitarian aid. More than ten million

Syrian citizens have been displaced internally or forced to seek asylum outside Syrian borders as refugees (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). A chart showing the dispersion of Syrian migrants to various countries in 2018 is shown in Figure 1 below.




Figure 2: Percentage of the total Syrian refugees by country of asylum.

1.2. Problem Statement

Syrians find themselves subjected to new abuses as a result of their displacement, and often experience negative attitudes within their country or in refugee camps in surrounding countries. Current studies indicate that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have not done enough to enhance the situation of Syrian refugees, in large part because they did not sign the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention (referred to as the 1951 Convention hereafter) (BBC 2016).

For the purpose of this study, various definitions are used to label the subjects of the research based on their legal status and recognition by either international organizations or the State of Qatar. Thus, “**displaced persons**” or “**displacement**” will refer to the forced movement of people from their locality, which could be internally (within their countries) or externally (outside their countries borders). This occurs mostly because of wars or natural disasters. On the other hand, “**refugee**” refers to a person who is forced to leave his home country because of war or persecution or natural disasters, living either in refugee camps or as an asylum seeker according to the 1951 Convention. Finally, “**forced migrant**” refers to a person who is forced to leave his or her home country because of war, persecution or natural disasters, but is located in countries in which official refugee status is not recognized. For this study the term ‘forced migrants’ is used to describe the Syrian displaced persons who fled their country as a consequence of the crisis and entered GCC countries, which are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Following these definitions, this study aims to explore the experiences of “forced migrants” in Qatar, as well as to assess the assistance provided by Qatar to the “refugees” located in camps in countries where this status is recognized.

This dissertation provides a study into the efforts made by the State of Qatar to assist the plight of Syrian refugees in the region, and the experiences of the Syrian forced migrants who entered Qatar after the crisis. The plight of refugees is an evolving phenomenon. This is because the challenges facing refugees do not end when they leave their country, but continue when they arrive in another country and are faced with the challenge of starting a new life in an entirely different environment.

This paper focuses on the issues displaced Syrians face as they embark on rebuilding their lives, with a special focus on Syrian forced migrants who have entered Qatar. The paper answers the question of how Syrians enter Qatar, their options for employment and their options regarding accommodation. This is contrary to the common view that countries in the GCC have failed to shoulder the responsibility of opening their borders to their Muslim brothers and sisters fleeing violence and death in Syria, for which these nations have been strongly criticized. However, some studies have revealed that GCC states have done a little to address the Syrian refugee situation. This research seeks to determine the extent to which these revelations are true. The research uses a range of methods in the examination of issues surrounding the plight of Syrian migrants who have arrived in Qatar since the crisis.

1.3. Main Research Question

This study aims to answer the following primary research question:

- What efforts have been made by the State of Qatar to improve the situation of “displaced” Syrians after the crisis?

This question could be answered by addressing three secondary questions:

- What efforts have been made by the Qatari government to assist Syrian “refugees” who are displaced elsewhere?
- What are the experiences of Syrian migrants in relation to the Qatari’s government actions?
- What efforts have been made by the Qatari government to address issues regarding Syrian “forced migrants” inside Qatar?

1.4. Research Hypothesis

Following the research questions mentioned above, this study aims to test the following hypothesis. First, that regardless of not being a signatory member of the 1951 Convention on refugees, the State of Qatar continues to enhance the experiences of both Syrian forced migrants inside Qatar and Syrian refugees in the region through a diversity of humanitarian aid tools and initiatives.

In order to demonstrate that hypothesis, the experiences of the Syrian forced migrants in Qatar, as well as the funding provided to humanitarian aid by the Qatari government will serve as variables for this study.

1.5. Theoretical Framework

This study is based on the concept of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is grounded in the idea of moral universalism and argues for the equal moral status of all people. In its support of humanitarian intervention, liberal cosmopolitanism makes three key assumptions. The first one is that all people have equal rights and freedoms, which key institutions are meant to protect. The second assumption is that all people have these rights and freedoms irrespective of their cultural, religious and national backgrounds. The final assumption is that it is the concern of all people, states and organizations to protect these rights and freedoms (Janse, 2006). As such, the liberal cosmopolitan view has its basis in a theoretical foundation that supports the authority of morality as well as universal human rights. Teson (2003) argues that in situations where some people are denied basic human rights, and are therefore unable to pursue their independent projects, it is the primary duty of others to step in and help. From the liberal cosmopolitanism perspective, violating universal human rights is not moral, and theoretical support for humanitarian intervention is thus provided by the authority of morality. By analyzing the plight of Syrian refugees, particularly those who seek asylum in the Middle East, this study hopes to relate the concept of cosmopolitanism to the Syrian crisis. The crisis is an ideal study, since it helps us to determine whether or not liberal cosmopolitanism is actively realized through an examination of the treatment of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers within the State of Qatar.

1.6. Significance of the Study and Objectives

Within the Gulf region, there is limited literature on the Syrian situation and GCC countries' management of displaced Syrians, whether they are refugees or forced migrants, even though the majority of refugees in the world today have come from this region. The Syrian crisis has led to the country becoming an alleged battlefield for a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the GCC, the proportion of foreign migrants is greater than that of the resident populations, with the exception of two nations, Saudi Arabia and Oman. Most of the GCC nations lack comprehensive information regarding aliens, and it is not easy to find data from alternative sources. Furthermore, countries that produce refugees do not keep records of citizens leaving, and it is an onerous task to find information regarding those returning or migrating. In some cases, these citizens avoid signaling when they depart and might not want to be recorded, preferring to be overlooked. Thus agencies rely on information from the host country to evaluate the characteristics and number of refugees and asylum seekers.

In 2012, the six Gulf States unanimously expelled the Syrian ambassadors. In Qatar, the situation was worse because it supported a group that opposed the Syrian government. Named the Syrian National Coalition, this anti-Assad group received Syrian representation from the Qatari government. The group received a mandate to deal with administrative needs concerning Qatar-based Syrians. Afterward, it was supposed to extend its mandate to expatriates from Syria to other nations in the Gulf region by June 2015.

The fact that the Gulf states did not sign the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol implies that humanitarian efforts by major refugee organizations are limited within GCC borders. Although one may read information regarding the plight of refugees and asylum seekers in the GCC, the credibility of the sources from within this region may be subjected to scrutiny because of possible bias. Figures corresponding to the stock of refugees have no support from official documentation, and those who publish the information give no sources to verify the authenticity of such reports. Qatar's actions depict its opposition to the plight of the al-Assad regime. Qatar has reportedly armed rebels in Syria and donated millions of dollars to assist refugees. However, the nation does not have official documentation about the programs aimed at assisting refugees. The plight of Syrian refugees in the country should also be questioned, since the Ministry of Education (known as the Supreme Education Council) does not admit students without residency permits into its schools. As such, Syrian refugees and asylum seekers may not be eligible for certain programs if they hold temporary visas.

This study aims to fill a gap in the literature by providing insight into the situation of displaced Syrians in Qatar, and thus may provide useful information for humanitarian organizations and others wishing to understand the plight of Syrian migrants. It will also suggest how the Qatari government could do more to improve the situation of the Syrian migrants within Qatar.

The remainder of this study is structured as follows:

- Chapter 2 reviews the literature available on refugees in the Gulf region, as well as the relevant international law.
- Chapter 3 describes the research approach, the methodology and the data collection process.
- Chapter 4 presents the collected data and analysis.
- Chapter 5 presents and discusses the results and findings of the research.
- Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter comprises various literature sources used to address the hypothesis of this study. The sources presented are primarily articles, journals and previous research conducted by various authors on the migrant crisis in Syria and refugees in the Gulf region. The chapter is divided into sections based on the areas of research that the literature sources are addressing. The first section entails the response of Western nations to the Syrian crisis, primarily based on humanitarian aid and support. The second section, on the other hand, focuses on how the Gulf nations have responded to the crisis; this functions as a comparison to the Western approach. This chapter also seeks to expound on the 1951 Convention and the member states that are signatories. This includes pointing out some of the issues with the convention, which have often been cited by non-signatory members. The chapter then presents Lebanon as a case study on how Gulf nations have often handled refugees. To place the study into context, literature sources related to international humanitarian laws and trends in refugee populations in recent years are also presented in different sections. The chapter also examines trends in refugee populations around the world and how the Gulf States have responded. Finally, the chapter presents the case of Qatar and how it has handled refugees and migrant crises in recent years, both internally and externally.

2.1. Western Nations and the Syrian Crisis

Critics have frequently questioned the contribution of GCC countries to resolving the Syrian refugees' predicament. According to Martinez (2015), many European and Western nations have accepted refugees as per the 1951 Convention, which invites criticism of the Gulf countries (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1951). GCC countries have defended themselves by claiming that they have taken in refugees as asylum seekers (Schatz, 2016). However, according to the official figures posted on the UNHCR website, Western nations continue to bear the brunt of asylum seekers, especially from Syria and thus the credibility of this claim by the GCC is doubtful. (Tyyskä, Blower, DeBoer, Kawai, & Walcott, 2017). However, according to the GCC, critics have not considered asylum seekers as refugees, resulting in the assumption that they have not significantly contributed to the resolution of the refugee crisis. The UNHCR (2017b) defines a refugee as an individual fleeing persecution or conflict, and international law identifies and protects him or her from expulsion or returning to situations that threaten his or her freedom and life. On the other hand, an asylum seeker is an individual that requests sanctuary in a given nation but is yet to be processed (UNHCR, 2017a). Another aspect that can be used as a basis for determining how nations are engaged in the Syrian crisis is the amount of money or foreign aid donated to Syria and its citizens. The figures in this regard indicate that the European Union and the United States are at the top of the list of donors (Syrianrefugees.eu, n.d.). Although this may suggest that Western nations are more proactive, GCC countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with much lower gross domestic

products also feature predominantly on the list. The graph below shows the amount of donations in US dollars given to Syria by various nations.




Figure 3: Graph showing humanitarian aid given to Syria in million \$US by the top 10 international donors (source: Syrianrefugees.eu)

Additionally, there are some GCC countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which claim to have directly received thousands of refugees and to have provided them with benefits such as free healthcare and education (Khazaal, 2015). GCC member countries are non-

signatories to the 1951 Convention and, therefore, are not obliged by law to resettle refugees, which might explain the reason for the ambiguity in their actions.

2.2. The GCC and the Syrian Crisis

Gulf refugee policies are complex, thus making it difficult to understand their reasons for not accepting refugees. According to Malsin (2015), the Violations Documentation Centre, which is a human rights group for Syrians, claim that it is imperative to tighten border restrictions within the GCC to aid refugees to migrate to the European Union. Non-signatory countries do not give any clear reasons for denying refugees entry. Many arguments have been voiced in an attempt to explain such a stand. In Qatar, it is argued that foreigners already outnumber Qatari citizens, ruling out the possibility that refugees are denied entry into the country because they might create a foreigner–citizen imbalance. Bershidsky (2015) adds that the deceptiveness experienced in close cultural exchanges between Syrians seeking asylum and nationals of GCC nations limits the propensity of these countries to accept foreigners from the war-torn country. Some non-signatory countries claim that taking in refugees may influence their social and cultural beliefs, as well as lifestyles and religion. Moreover, these non-signatories view the taking in of refugees as provocation to the refugees' enemies, which might bring war to their countries. Therefore, to maintain peace and harmony, they would rather give financial aid to refugees outside their borders.

The six Gulf countries, Qatar included, have not provided any resettlement places for Syrian refugees. By October of 2018, there were about 397,353 registered Syrian refugees living in camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt (Data2.unhcr.org,

2018). This is in comparison with Western countries, especially in Europe, which, up to the present, have hosted the majority of the 5,640,421 total registered Syrian refugees (Data2.unhcr.org, 2018).

The Gulf faces criticism for not accepting refugees while Western countries and European nations are opening their doors to refugees. In this regard, the question that critics do not ask themselves is whether the Gulf is to blame for rejecting refugees. According to Kayaoğlu (2015), the Gulf is not to blame for the Syrian crisis. He argues that a mix of social, economic and domestic political considerations have influenced the Gulf's actions. Kayaoğlu points out that Qatar is a small country and that therefore, unlike other nations, does not have the luxury of bringing in refugees. In addition to the socio-economic, demographic and political factors affecting the acceptance of refugees into the Gulf countries, lurking security risks are also at the forefront of policymakers' minds. In this regard, Kayaoglu (2015) states that the possibility of Islamic State and Al-Qaeda militants blending in with refugees and moving to the Gulf, Europe and North America is extremely high. Therefore, perceived security risks, socio-economic constraints and domestic political considerations may be the reasons behind the GCC's reluctance to receive refugees.

2.3. The 1951 United Nations Convention

After 3000 Afghani boats arrived on the shores of Australia (albeit a small number compared with the million Afghans who were hosted by Iran and Pakistan), this sparked a debate over refugees in Australia in 2000, implying that countries began to look carefully at the 1951 United Nations Convention (Parliament of Australia, 2000).

This agreement related to the 1967 Protocol and the status of refugees throughout the world. The world has three sets of nations regarding economic power according to the World Economic Situations Prospect of the United Nations (2018). The first set entails rich countries, referred to as the developed economies, which have no issue with the implementation of the program; examples include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development nations. The second set comprises developing economies that discourage refugees from seeking asylum. One of these is the war-torn republic of Somalia, which signed the 1951 Convention. The final set involves emerging economies in proximity to countries that send refugees; these are not signatories to the protocol. Examples include Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and India, whose chief reason for not signing is to avoid attracting refugees from neighbouring nations (United Nations, 2018).

Figure 3 below shows the signatories and non-signatories of the 1951 Convention. The figure shows that some of the Gulf nations are non-members, including Qatar (Forced Migration Review, 2018).



Figure 4: Signatories and non-signatories of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol (Source: Forced Migration Review (2018))

From a historical viewpoint, creating the 1951 Convention enabled governments to deal with the mass numbers of refugees in war-torn Europe after World War II and later during the Cold War in the 1950s. The number of refugees has significantly increased since that time, with the UNHCR highlighting the 1.7 million refugees in Pakistan at the end of 2011. Consequently, signing the 1951 Convention has had resource implications for nations that welcome refugees. For instance, nations that admitted refugees into their borders are obliged to provide the humanitarian aid that comes with being the host nation. The nations also have to mobilize more resources to enhance security measures, such as vetting these refugees to ensure that terrorism threats and other security concerns are addressed.

Poorer nations are confronted by the costs of processing the claims of asylum seekers, and meeting their housing, health and education needs. In particular, governments of the nations in proximity to war-torn areas find these obligations to be significant practical resource issues. The foreign ministry in Malaysia, for instance, does not accept refugees because its geographical location would allow an influx of asylum seekers. It would mean that the country would potentially resettle hundreds of thousands of refugees in its camps. The Malaysian government considers the task of providing solutions, assistance and protection to refugees to be an obligation of the international community. Consequently, the nation may provide asylum seekers and refugees with aid; however, in this regard, the UNHCR provides the necessary services and resources.

To have these services and resources available for its operations, the UNHCR also receives funds from donor nations. The donations received are crucial in the UNHCR's annual expenditure, as well as that of the various humanitarian operations that the international organization oversees. For instance, the 2017 annual budget for the UNHCR totaled \$3,249,999,178. The biggest donor for the Organization during this period was the United States, which donated \$1,460,236,943. Other main suppliers of funds included the European Union, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The list also showed that some of the GCC Countries made donations. The state of Qatar was the biggest donor, which donated \$26,804,578. Saudi Arabia came second among the GCC countries, donating \$17,436,078, whereas the UAE, Kuwait and Oman donated \$9,878,349, \$8,199,289 and \$301,213 respectively. This demonstrates that even though some countries are not signatories of the 1951 Convention, they still actively play a role

in the provision of humanitarian aid to refugees (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). As such, the 1951 Convention system does not reflect practical considerations or the reality of hosting refugees. Several nations that have not yet signed the 1951 Convention exist in areas where many of their neighbors are non-signatories. Thus they may only get support and access to a regional system if they deal with these nations.

2.4. Issues with the 1951 Convention

According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is an individual who is persecuted for reasons of political or social group opinion, nationality, religion and/or race (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1951). In this case, this person is outside his/her country of citizenship, and is unwilling or unable to return to this nation to get protection. One of the obligations is avoiding penalizing them for illegal entry; the other is not sending such persons back to their country of origin. Although this seems like an excellent way to deal with refugees, the 1951 Convention does not fit the current century. Firstly, the 1951 Convention fosters an unfortunate and simplistic characterization of refugees as poor and needy, juxtaposing this with abuse or political frameworks, which implies that the refugees are genuine and deserving. Secondly, asylum seekers do not receive the same public sympathy as refugees. For instance, in countries such as Australia, the majority of the public has often maintained that asylum seekers should be kept in detention camps. This is backed by a study conducted by the Lowy Institute, which ranks asylum seekers arriving by boat on Australian shores as the sixth greatest threat to Australia's vital interests, listed by 38% of responses from interviewees (Oliver,

2017). Thirdly, nations in the West spend more funds on supporting and resettling asylum seekers than others, and their contributions to the UNHCR are significantly greater than those of other countries. Zamora et al. (2015) stated that the United States has admitted over 20,000 asylum seekers from 2001 to 2013

In 2014, the European Union resettled 7525 persons and the figure of refugees from all source countries rose from 313,645 in 1998 to 627,780 in 2014 (Zamora et al., 2015). In 2015, 3765 asylum seekers were Syrian compared with 122,065 in 2014. This is verified by official data from the UNHCR website, which notes that in 2014, Europe settled around 714,300 asylum seekers, a rise of 47% from the previous year. The UNHCR further noted that the top five countries with the most asylum seekers application were Germany, the United States, Turkey, Sweden and Italy. These nations received the majority of the applications at 60% of all applications United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2014). In this list, the majority of these countries are Western nations. Fourthly, the inequity between the signatory countries to the 1951 Convention and camp refugees is significant, with priority being accorded in the context of mobility rather than necessity.

Fifthly, the Convention does not consider the social, financial and political effects of an influx of asylum seekers into a particular country. Sixthly, the 1951 Convention also does not confer any aid to refugees until they arrive in a signatory nation. As such, the country that expels or persecutes citizens does not come under any obligation. Even more significantly, the 1951 Convention does not require the burden of meeting refugees' needs to be shared between the signatory and refugee-sending country. Finally, the 1951

Convention's definition of refugees, as well as the notion of exile as a solution to issues they face, is outdated.

2.5. Lessons from Lebanon: Migration Trends and Consequences

Countries that choose to welcome refugees may find it a difficult task to deal with the influx. For instance, Lebanon is in close geographic proximity to Syria, which means it is one of the most prominent destinations for Syrian refugees. The country is only the size of Qatar and has a population of 4 million persons, but it has 1.2 million Syrian refugees (Dionigi, 2014). In this case, Lebanese institutions have had to take five critical steps to ensure the safety of refugees. Firstly, they needed to develop and establish regional cooperation to protect refugees. Second, the civil and academic community was obliged to support communication and develop research methods to depict the crisis in a realistic manner that aimed to resolve problems as well as avoid xenophobic rhetoric from spreading. Thirdly, these institutions had to allow Syrian refugees in the country to enjoy the fundamental rights of citizens as well as access to essential life services (Dionigi, 2014). As a fourth step, political groups were required to address the presence of Syrian refugees in the nation as a humanitarian crisis. As such, this enabled them to avoid further politicizing the identity of refugees in linking their presence to a broad set of existing sectarian or political factions. Finally, Lebanese institutions needed to develop a transparent legal system that provided refugees with a well-defined status to protect their human rights (Dionigi, 2014).

The Lebanese public was also tasked with three obligations. Firstly, it needed to be aware that nations and their governments have a global legal duty to aid in the protection and assistance of refugees. As such, the context of these considerations is international customary law, reinforced by several international treaties that many nations ratify regularly. Second, the public should use documented and reliable sources concerning refugees in their country (Dionigi, 2014). In this case, they should avoid adopting superficial unjustified perceptions and stereotypes caused by insecurity that relate to the process of immigration. Lastly, the public should donate to transparent and reputable aid organizations that publicly give an account of their activities. Although these recommendations appear plausible, one should note that Syrian refugees make up about one quarter of Lebanon's entire population. Thus, the implications from an economic, social and political viewpoint are significant.

2.6. International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law is a set of rules that aim to reduce the impact of war. As such, this law is applied to guarantee the protection of individuals who no longer participate in armed conflict in their nation (Jaquemet, 2001). Accordingly, refugees and asylum seekers are people who have crossed international frontiers and are at risk of being persecuted by their country of origin. The human rights law, with its principle of non-refoulement (i.e. not forcing refugees and asylum seekers to return to a country where they may be in danger because of their race, religion, political opinion, etc.), protects refugees. Similarly, the refugee law accords them protection under the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1951

Convention (Jaquemet, 2001). International humanitarian law also protects refugees within a nation that participates in a war. As such, general protection is accorded in addition to the security civilians receive under this legislation, to complement the Additional Protocol I and the Fourth Geneva Convention. This legislation implies that the nations involved in armed conflicts should not distinguish refugees from nationals and should not attempt to treat them as aliens, especially when they do not receive protection from any other nation. Consequently, international humanitarian law prohibits collective punishment that entails destroying refugees' houses or establishments (Jaquemet, 2001). Similarly, it forbids the starvation of refugees or the destruction of any object on which they depend to survive; it also states that it is illegal to attack refugees or their establishments directly. In situations of armed conflict, it is imperative to let refugees and asylum seekers gain access to humanitarian aid and relief agencies that support their well-being. The nations involved in the war should assist in the supply of relief tents, blankets, foodstuffs and medications.

2.7. Trends in Refugee Populations around the World

According to the Pew Research Center, the world had more than 60 million displaced persons in 2015 (Connor, 2016). The UNHCR quotes this figure as 65.6 million individuals, 22.5 million of whom are refugees and over half are under the age of 18 (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2017). Although about 190,000 refugees were resettled in 2016, 10 million remain stateless. Fifty-five percent of the refugees and asylum seekers in the world originate from three nations, namely Syria,

Afghanistan and South Sudan. Figure 4 below is an illustration of the major source countries for refugees in 2016.




Figure 5: Major Source Countries of Refugees in 2016 (Source: United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2016)).

Refugees and asylum seekers are hosted in different parts of the world. Africa has taken 30%; the Middle East, and North Africa, 26%; Europe, 17%; the Americas, 16%; and Asia-Pacific, 11%. The top hosting nations for refugees and asylum seekers include Turkey (2.9 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Lebanon (1 million), Islamic Republic of Iran (979,400), Uganda (940,800) and Ethiopia (791,600) (Figure 5). The 10 million stateless individuals have no access to fundamental human rights like the freedom of movement, employment, medical care and education.




Figure 6: Major host countries of refugees (Source: UNHCR global trends)

Approximately 50% of the refugees and asylum seekers seeking entry into the United States are Muslim (Connor, 2016). In Greece, about 100 refugees arrived on boats in the summer of 2016 from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, compared with the thousands who came earlier. In 2015, European Union countries, including Switzerland and Norway, received 1.3 million refugees and asylum seekers, 378,000 of whom were from Syria (Connor, 2016). This is illustrated in Figure 6 below. In 2015, about 4 million Syrians were displaced from their homes. Currently, the total number of displaced Syrians stands at 12.5 million. Of these, about 6 million are internally displaced persons, 1 million seek asylum in Europe, and the rest are refugees in North Africa, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. This figure is unprecedented, since only 1 million Syrians were displaced in 2011. Figure 7 below illustrates the rise in Syrian refugees in the last couple of years.

Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis were over half of all Europe's asylum seekers in 2015

Citizenship of first-time asylum applicants in Europe, 2015

	Total	% of all asylum applications
Syria	378,000	29
Afghanistan	193,000	15
Iraq	127,000	10
Kosovo	68,000	5
Albania	67,000	5
Pakistan	47,000	4
Eritrea	46,000	3
Nigeria	31,000	2
Iran	27,000	2
Somalia	21,000	2
Ukraine	21,000	2
Serbia	19,000	1
Russia	19,000	1
Bangladesh	18,000	1
Gambia	13,000	1
Other	230,000	17
TOTAL	1,325,000	100

Figure 7: European asylum seekers in 2015 (Source: Pew Research Center).




Figure 8: Number of Syrian refugees between 2013 and 2018 (Source: United Nations High Commission of Refugees).

2.8. The Contribution of the Gulf States

As the migrant crisis continues to escalate on the borders of Europe, Gulf states have been blamed for not offering any resettlement places to Syrian refugees escaping the war. In response, Kuwait claimed it had granted long-term residency permits to Syrian refugees and asylum seekers (De Bel-Air, 2015).

Similarly, the government of the UAE said it had provided refuge to the 100,000 Syrian refugees who entered the country and has about 2.5 times that number coexisting with its nationals (Uae-embassy.org, n.d.) (Figure 8).




Figure 9: UAE support to Syria (Source: Uae-embassy.org)

Additionally, the Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia responded that since the onset of the crisis in Syria in 2011, it had offered asylum to over 2.5 million Syrian nationals (De Bel-Air, 2015). Furthermore, its schools have registered over 100,000 students from the crisis-torn nation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also

considers any expatriate as a guest with a temporary work contract or visitor visa, but the probability of reuniting them with their families is very small. Consequently, the claims of governments in the GCC raise several queries. Firstly, one may question the role these nations played in the enforcement of incentives to provide support to individuals from Syria who were fleeing from the crisis. Secondly, one may question the notion of allowing more Syrian refugees and asylum seekers to enter their borders by relaxing residency and entry restrictions beyond the average flow of dependents and employees. Finally, the available data on demographics should support their claims of assisting refugees and asylum seekers from Syria.

2.9. Efforts Made by Qatar

2.9.1. Internal Efforts: Syrian Migrants who Entered Qatar since the Crisis

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis at the end of 2010, many headlines in the international media from observers have criticized how member states of the GCC (which include Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia) have helped, or not helped, in the resettlement of Syrian refugees. Typical examples of such headlines include the following: “For desperate Syrian refugees, the Arab Gulf is not an option” (The Times, 2015), “The Gulf States should do more for Syrian refugees” (Al-Khatteeb, 2015), “U.N. calls on Gulf countries to do more to help Syrian refugees” (Middle East Observer, 2017). However, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Khalid Al Attiyah, was quoted by Doha News as saying that Qatar had in no way fallen short in extending a hand to help Syrian refugees (Kovessy, 2016). He stated that Qatar had opened its borders to over 25,000

refugees of Syrian origin since the country slid into civil war in 2011. However, to be accurate, Qatar does not recognize the “refugee” category, and instead refers to the displaced Syrians as “migrants” or sometimes “guests”.

2.9.2. External Efforts: Aid for Syrian Refugees

In the summer of 2015, Qatar instituted new initiatives to feed the refugees situated in Lebanon, provide treatment and medical supplies for wounded refugees located in Jordan, and provide clean drinking water for others inside Qatar. Qatar has been relentless in calling for the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad from power. It also was the first country to have a Syrian embassy that was run by the Syrian opposition in Doha. The UNHCR has confirmed that the GCC countries, led by Qatar, have been the biggest contributors in terms of dollars to United Nations programs that are geared toward helping Syrian refugees (Kovessy, 2016). However, many people feel that these countries could do much more, considering that the GCC countries have also helped to foster the escalation of the Syrian crisis by funding rebel groups that have been trying to overthrow al-Assad’s regime. Most of these countries, including Qatar, have publicly declared support for political factions as well as supplying weapons and engaging in ideological discourse around the Syrian crisis (Chulov, 2012). In addition, the GCC countries are the wealthiest in the region, and have better facilities and infrastructure that could easily allow them to settle refugees compared with countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, which still import much of their energy and have weaker infrastructure. Many of the GCC countries also have a significant demographic imbalance, with the majority of

their populations being made up of people from foreign countries; some having as much as 80% of their populations made up of foreigners.

One of the reasons why GCC countries are unwilling to comply with international laws on refugees and opening borders to refugees is that most, if not all, of them are not signatories to the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR Protocol of 1967 that defined the status of refugees and how state parties should approach and handle refugee crises when they arise (Forced Migration Review, 2018). The GCC countries, along with 37 other countries, failed to ratify this convention, as they had not given proof of how they would comply with internationally agreed humanitarian standards as well as their ability to work with the UNHCR. There are a number of reasons why the countries that chose not to sign might have undertaken this decision at the time. In my opinion, perhaps the most fundamental reasons were political. For instance, a large part of the world's nations at the time might have not been independent and, as such, decisions such as this one were reliant on the colonial powers that governed them. Another reason that may have been cited by the nations that chose not to sign was perhaps the lack of clear procedures and guidelines on how to admit and facilitate refugees in the host nations. Economic capabilities and the challenges that come with hosting refugees may have also played a role in the decision made by the 37 nations not to sign the convention. Finally, some of the countries may have been reluctant to sign because of the compromises they would have to reach in as far as their own national security was concerned, along with international context in light of the 1948 Israeli war. This has become increasingly

evident in recent years as more and more countries, especially in Europe, become reluctant to admit refugees, citing security reasons and terrorism concerns.

Refugees face a host of challenges, both as they seek asylum and when they land in the host countries and start the process of rebuilding their lives. Refugees and their plight pose a development issue with socio-economic ramifications. Some of the refugees perish in seas and forests as they attempt to run from violence. Children and women suffer immensely as they bear the brunt of war (Barnard, 2015). Diseases and hunger ravage many of them on their journeys to new countries, especially if the host country has no friendly pro-refugee policies.

2.10 Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter scrutinizes the various sources related to the research topic by placing them into context. In this chapter, a comparison between Western nations and the GCC regarding the nature and amount of aid to Syria was presented. The chapter implies that despite GCC members not being a part of the 1951 Convention, they are doing their part to mitigate the neighbouring Syrian crisis. The last sections of the chapter then concentrated on Qatar's efforts and role in the mitigation of this crisis. The efforts in this case are both internal, in the form of accepting Syrian migrants who enter via visas, and external, in the form of aid contributions to organisations providing aid to those affected by the Syrian migrant crisis.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

In this chapter, the methodology that was used to complete the research objectives is described in detail. To do so, the research approach is first defined and the sources that were used to obtain data relevant to the research are also addressed. Since the research primarily involved the collection and analysis of qualitative data, various criteria that were applied are also described, including the sampling methods used, the sample sizes and the participants involved in the research. The methods used to collect relevant data for the study and the ethical considerations before carrying out the study are also addressed in separate sections.

3.1. Research Approach and Data Sources

The research methodology used to answer the research questions relies primarily upon a qualitative methods approach while also drawing upon a number of secondary sources. This entailed the collection, analysis and integration of qualitative research. In this case, the qualitative data included open-ended data gathered through interviews. Data analysis in this research methodology involves checklists to test hypotheses or respond to the research questions while using statistical analysis of the data collected via various instruments. Although each of these approaches is different, implementing this approach ensures that the research addresses the depth and breadth of the phenomenon, and enables the study to offset the inherent deficiencies of a single approach. Consequently, this approach was chosen in this case because of its ability to explain the findings. The study used interviews, secondary data and documentary analysis.

The primary aim of this study was to identify the efforts made by the State of Qatar to improve the situation of displaced Syrians within Qatar after the Syrian crisis. Additionally, a limited amount of quantitative data was gathered in the form of statistics about the number of Syrians living in Qatar and information about state aid provided to Syrian refugees. The qualitative part of the research aimed to explore the experiences of Syrian migrants who entered Qatar after the crisis.

The methods used in this research to collect primary data included home visits, interviews with 10 households (15-minute semi-structured individual interviews) and one interview with an expert, Mr. Adrdor from Qatar Charity. In addition, during the interviews with the Syrian migrants, I also tried to observe their living conditions. Interviews were conducted from March 2018 to May 2018.

To establish the extent to which Qatar has contributed to the humanitarian efforts in Syria, the researcher combed through data available through the Financial Tracking Service. Additionally, the researcher carried out an online search to establish the number of Syrian immigrants hosted in Qatar. The researcher also conducted an interview with an expert working with a non-governmental organization (NGO), Qatar Charity, to examine ways in which Qatar-based NGOs help people fleeing from Syria as well as those displaced within the country.

The primary data used for this research included interviews that were conducted with 10 Syrian forced migrants who entered Qatar after the crisis. Additional data from various humanitarian organizations such as the UNHCR was also incorporated to give insight and context.

The Qatari government has recorded the number of Syrians who entered Qatar after the crisis in 2011 and their visa status, but these figures were impossible to obtain, although this is essential information for this study. The records are confidential and after the long process of obtaining access to them, I had to sign a pledge not to share them or cite them in my study. However, the ministry of Statistics guided me to use publicly available published data, since these figures do not vary much from the accurate figures kept confidential by the government.

The secondary data sources of for the study include public records that are freely accessible. Most of the data were sourced from the Human Rights Commission and the UNHCR's website and database. In addition, a published interview with Mr. Khlid Alatyaa, the Minister of Defense in the State of Qatar, and other published articles and books were used as sources of information.

3.2. Research Design

3.2.1. Choice of Qualitative Method

Research on Syrian migrants in Qatar was conducted by assessing the personal stories and experiences of individuals to gain an insight into their plight and the abuses they are being subjected as a result of being displaced. By using qualitative methods, the research aimed to understand the different perspectives of the facts and the implications outlined by the migrants. In this case, such an approach helped to ensure that factual first-hand information from the subjects was obtained for deciphering and analyzing the situation of Syrian migrants who entered Qatar after the Syrian crisis. In particular, the

research involved conducting interviews with Syrian migrants who entered Qatar after the Syrian crisis in 2010, who were randomly selected via the snowball sampling technique. In this case, the selection of research respondents at random aimed to eliminate bias and to enhance the research outcomes. In this regard, the extensive insights into the situation of Syrian migrants in Qatar were facilitated through the interviews, which aimed at understanding the experiences of the migrants.

In addition to the interviews, the prevailing situation faced by the Syrian migrants in Qatar will also be deduced by making a series of general observations. Through such efforts, it will be possible to identify suitable interventions that could be made by Qatar to improve the situation of Syrian immigrants, especially since the Syrian crisis. Contrary to the misleading information and propaganda that may be circulated by various media outlets, this approach will ensure that the real situation faced by the Syrian immigrants in Qatar can be determined, thus making it possible to judge whether substantial interventions have been initiated in Qatar. For instance, the situation can be evaluated through the assessment of previous projects and initiatives in Qatar, as well as the experiences faced by the Syrian migrants in Qatar. In this case, detailed stories of the experiences of different Syrian immigrants will help in establishing whether Qatar has been concerned about their plight and intervened appropriately through different humanitarian approaches. To achieve this, contact was made with 10 participants who were able to describe their journey and encounters while leaving Syria and arriving in Qatar.

This approach helped in getting first-hand information on any abuses or mistreatment that might have been perpetrated by the State of Qatar against the Syrian migrants. For this reason, each of the selected respondents for this study was accorded enough interview time to detail their experiences and encounters in Qatar. Specifically, the main emphasis was on key aspects such as possible harassment from various administrative entities in Qatar, and the perceptions and attitudes of the general public in Qatar. In order to avoid bias, these interviews were collected from Syrian migrants currently living in Qatar, an approach that further enhanced a relative comparison in terms of the general situation faced by such migrants. For this study, I felt it would be highly suitable to advertise the study and engage people who were ready to participate.

3.2.2. Sampling Method

In this research, I used the snowball sampling approach to select participants. The respondents were accessed via personal contact with friends and colleagues. The snowball sampling was applied within this society, where well-matched respondents were asked to propose other suitable respondents who could offer valid information for the study. The researcher identified one potential participant who helped to unearth others. Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling approach. Thus it has no probability involved. The researcher used personal judgment to select the initial participants.

The criteria for respondents to qualify to be involved in this study (Table 1) included the following: they had to be aged over 18 years because of the sensitive features of the research, which could result in ethical problems arising from interviewing young individuals. No inclusion measures such as gender, orientation, profession or income

level were used, as they were deemed to be insignificant for assessing experiences and the process of acclimatization.

Table 1:

Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Inclusion criteria	Exclusion criteria
Adults over 18 years	Minors below 18 years
Syrian migrants in Qatar who left their home country because of the crisis	Lived as migrants in other countries then entered Qatar
Syrian migrants who have been living in Doha for 12 months or more	Syrian migrants who have not yet spent complete 12 months in Qatar

Four possible participants were excluded because they had lived as migrants in other countries, which is a different experience; migrants with less than 12 months in Qatar, because of the limited nature of their experience, were also excluded.

3.2.3. Sample Size

Any appropriate persons who approached the researcher and met the research criteria were chosen on the basis of “first come first served” (Robinson, 2014). The researcher ensured that all participants were able to provide reliable information regarding the topic. If strong interest was shown by potential interviewees, they were contacted and emailed the ethical approval for the study given by Qatar University, attached to the interview questions. Afterward, they were given time to contact the researcher before I initiated contact with them in order to confirm their desire to participate in the study.

Although it is debatable, there are no specific rules for determining the sample size in a qualitative study. Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano and Morales (2007) claimed that narrative studies need only a collection of tales from a small number of people. Larger samples are essential for studies that seek to determine broader patterns in the data. Thus for this study, the sample size was 10 participants.

3.2.4. Participants

Ten participants (three males and seven females) were interviewed and took part in this research. Some initial demographic data of the respondents are represented in Table 2.

Table 2:

Demographic Details of Interviewees

No.	Participant's Name*	Gender	Age	Year Entered Qatar	Visa Type
1	KA	Male	55	2012	Working
2	FR	Female	42	2012	Family visit
3	OM	Male	24	2014	Working
4	OA	Male	28	2012	Student
5	AR	Female	32	2015	Working
6	UO	Female	30	2012	Family visit
7	SH	Female	32	2017	Family visit
8	AF	Female	30	2014	Family visit
9	AA	Female	31	2015	Family visit
10	MK	Female	21	2014	Student

* Names have been changed to protect privacy.

3.3. Data Collection

3.3.1. Secondary Data: Quantitative

The study aimed to discover how many Syrians live in Qatar and how many have entered the country since the Syrian crisis. To do this, I also accessed information from other websites to give more information on migration trends in Qatar and other Gulf States. One such website pointed to the increase (spike) in the overall populations of the Gulf states since 2011, which would suggest the entry of more migrants, mostly refugees ("GLMM - Gulf Labour Markets and Migration", n.d.). Table 3 below shows a sample of this information.

Table 3.

Estimates of Foreign Residents in Qatar by Country of Origin (Source:

Country of Citizenship	Estimates	Date of Reference
India	650,000	Dec 2016
Nepal	>350,000	Jan 2017
Bangladesh	280,000	May 2016
Philippines	260,000	Jan 2017
Egypt	200,000	Feb 2015
Sri Lanka	145,256	Dec 2016
Pakistan	125,000	Oct 2016
Syria	54,000	Nov 2015

Table 3 shows that among other nationalities of migrants, Syrians were the minority.

However, it is evidence that Qatar never stopped receiving Syrians.

3.3.2. Qualitative Data: Detailed Narratives and Interviews

Information concerning the situation of Syrian migrants in Qatar was collected through detailed interviews and narratives of the experiences faced by the selected respondents. Considering the in-depth nature of the required research work, the process of collecting data from the respondents took place over a period of two weeks to ensure that all the relevant information was collected. In this case, all the necessary logistical

arrangements were made via emails and phone calls to ensure that all was in order for effective collection of the desired data and information.

The scheduled interviews aimed at collecting information regarding the experience of Syrian migrants in Qatar as well as examples of how they have been permitted or denied their human rights by local officials in Qatar. In this case, the study aimed to collect responses from the selected respondents about a few sensitive topics that highlighted the abuses perpetrated against them during their stay. To allow time for such stories to emerge, the respondents were afforded enough time to detail their personal experiences in Qatar. Allocating enough time avoided situations where the respondents may have felt pressured into hurriedly giving the information needed for the research. This turned out to be the case, since all the relevant considerations were factored into the approach, which aimed to collect essential information and data regarding the experiences faced by Syrian migrants in Qatar. Similarly, this approach also aimed to capture the thoughts, feelings, remarks and emotions of the selected respondents regarding the whole issue of the circumstances and the experience of Syrian migrants in Qatar.

3.3.3. Interview Questions

The detailed narratives of the respondents facilitated comprehension of the situation faced by Syrian migrants in Qatar. Through the narratives obtained with the help of relevant leading interview questions, the respondents were able to describe their plight and the issues faced throughout their stay in Qatar as migrants. In particular, the leading interview questions aimed at highlighting the efforts that had been undertaken by the

State of Qatar to improve the situation of displaced Syrians following the conflict arising from the Syrian crisis. Such an approach aimed at elaborating the various aspects characterizing the situation of Syrian migrants in Qatar.

The interviews took a semi-structured format guided by a list of questions to prompt the interviewees and obtain their status. The full list of interview questions is presented in Appendix A. In summary, the interview questions covered topics such as personal details (age, marital status, etc.), the journey taken from Syria to Qatar, visa status, current employment, experiences in Qatar and plans for the future.

Some interviews were carried out in the homes of the Syrian migrants and some through phone calls at a time that suited the interviewees. The interviews were carried out in Arabic and took approximately 15 minutes.

Different approaches were used to analyze the collected data and information from the respondents. The data analysis process involved the transcription of the recorded interview narratives and further analysis of the transcripts.

3.3.4. Interview Transcription

The study relied on the verbal narratives of the respondents regarding the situation and the experience of Syrian migrants in Qatar. These narratives were recorded verbatim from the respondents where permission was given to do so. Afterward, the recordings were transcribed according to the principles of narration and discourse analysis. This involved writing down all the narratives as spoken by respondents. Because the main focus of the study was to establish the current status and the outcomes faced by Syrian

migrants in Qatar, the content of the interview recordings was the main emphasis, as opposed to the manner in which the narratives were presented by different respondents.

3.3.5. Analysis

The primary aim of the study was to analyze the recorded stories. This was done by examining the interview transcripts to discover themes and elements that were common to the various narratives. Some of the themes that arose from this examination included the route they came to Qatar, the reasons why they left Syria and the facilities they have (or need) as migrants who do not know if they will ever go back to Syria or whether they will remain migrants forever. The thematic analysis was designed to highlight answers to the significant questions the participants were asked and to give us a detailed picture of their lives. The analysis further revealed themes related to the route traveled from Syria to Qatar, visas and residency status, and healthcare and education.

3.3.6 The Syrian School

The Syrian school was a subject frequently discussed in the interviews, and this requires some background information. The Syrian school in Qatar, located in Duhail, is a community school that is the only school in Qatar that accepts and enrolls Syrian students without residency permits. The school offers classes starting at primary level up to twelfth grade. Based on the interviews that were conducted, it became clear that the school's numbers have been growing, with new pupils being admitted every year. Therefore, visiting the Syrian school was needed to have a closer look. On 17th October 2018, I visited the Syrian Community School and met the administration officials, Mr. Mohammed and Mr. Akram, who talked about the establishment of the school and their answers provided an insight into the major issues the school might be facing. The Syrian school was established in 2013; the Syrian embassy requested to have a school, especially after the arrival of a huge number of Syrians without residency who entered the country using visitors' visas. The suggestion from the Syrian embassy to establish a school in 2011 was welcomed by the Emir of Qatar, Emir Tamim bin Hammad Al Thani. A committee was held with number of Syrians, and academics from Turkey and Egypt, and they started the preparations for creating an administration and teachers to start the Syrian school. Thus, the building was provided by the Ministry of Education and the staff salaries are covered by the Ministry as well. However, the school is still in need of more support. From my visit I observed that the building was very old and small compared with the public schools in the State of Qatar.

At the time of the interview, the school had 900 students, all of whom are Syrians without residency. Once a child receives his or her residency, he/she loses his/her right to his study in the school, and must leave room for those who do not have residency. They have rejected around 240 students because of not having enough space or teachers. They submitted a request to the Ministry of Education to have extra space, and this was approved with the condition of no budget being granted. They requested funds from both Qatar Charity and Raf, but because of the many bureaucratic steps involved, no action has been taken so far. Luckily, in this case, a Syrian man donated money and they have new nine classes ready. However, they are still waiting for the Ministry of Education to approve the hiring of teachers for the new classes and thus the current status of the new developments is still pending.

3.4. Ethical Considerations

3.4.1. Confidentiality

The main focus of the study was to get to know the experiences of Syrian migrants in Qatar. For this reason, the anonymity of the respondents was respected by not revealing their identities to other parties. The majority of the participants were very fearful and were initially suspicious about the purpose of the research. I clarified that the data were collected for study purposes only as part of a M.A. degree and that the research had nothing to do with the government. Moreover, to protect the participants' identities, their real names have not been used in the study as I have opted for the use of pseudonyms. In addition, for those who did not want to be recorded, notes were taken instead of recordings.

3.4.2. Informed Consent

Throughout the entire process of collecting information from respondents, proper communication regarding the intentions of the study was ensured. All of the selected respondents gave consent for the personal accounts of their experiences in Qatar to be used in the study, thus upholding the ethical principle of informed consent.

3.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines what methods were used in the collection and analysis of data, so as to fulfil the research objectives. It begins by portraying the research approach, which is dependent on qualitative methods; the methods used in the research involve reference to data sources and conducting interviews rather than surveys. However, secondary quantitative methods were also used in the analysis of the collected data and essentially encompass tables and statistical inferences. The chapter then concludes by noting the ethical considerations that were put in place, since the research includes the involvement of human participants.

Chapter 4: Data Collection and Analysis

This chapter explains the various methods that were used to collect useful data. The data collected was predominantly of a qualitative nature and also involved published data from previous authors, as well as current projections and statistics from relevant expert bodies. To conclude up the chapter, data related to Qatar's regional position in terms of its involvement with refugees were also collected.

4.1. Secondary Data: Quantitative

4.1.1. Published Data

To find out the current number of Syrian immigrants in Qatar, the researcher communicated with the Ministry of Statistics and Planning, which is linked to the Ministry of Immigration. The researcher found old data on the official website of the Ministry of Statistics and Planning dating back to the time before the Syrian conflict broke out. The data were published in 2007. Other figures on the number of Syrians in Qatar were published in 2015 by Priya Dsouza, who studied the trends in Qatar's expatriate populations. The figures she published in her report showed a great increase in the number of Syrians in Qatar, including those who entered Qatar after the Syrian crisis and, in some cases, those who have been born since that time to migrant families living in Qatar. According to these data, there were about 54,000 Syrians in Qatar as of 2015, representing 2.2% of the immigrant population in the country. This is illustrated in Figure 9 below. The researcher also went through the worlddata.info database, where it was

established that in 2016, 21 Syrians made asylum applications in Qatar. Out of these, 18 were accepted (Worlddata, 2018).




Figure 10: Proportion of the Syrian population in Qatar in 2015.

Since 2013, Qatar has been sending humanitarian aid to Syria. In 2013, the Government of Qatar gave Syrian people affected by the conflict a total of \$100 million in aid (Reuters Staff, 2013). By September 2017, the total amount of money that Qatar had given in support of human rights in Syria was \$1.6 billion, as reported by the Government Communication Office (Bukhari, 2017). This shows a significant rise in the aid given to the Syrian people over a short period of time, as illustrated in Figure 10 below. Qatar-based charity organizations have also made significant aid contributions, totaling \$452.6 million (Bukhari, 2017). The organizations include Qatar Red Crescent,

Qatar Charity, Afif Charity and Eid Charity. Qatar has also initiated a number of projects in Syria, including the Education Above All initiative, which has been able to provide education to about 985,000 Syrian children at a cost of \$62 million starting in 2012. Another initiative called the Qatar Upholding Education for Syrians Trust was launched in 2016 at a cost of \$150 million to support the education of about 400,000 Syrian children living in refugee camps (Bukhari, 2017) and this is still ongoing.




Figure 11: Qatari aid to Syrian refugees in 2013 and 2017.

4.1.2. Data from the Financial Tracking Service

Although there are countries ahead of Qatar in terms of aid provided to the Syrian people, Qatar has also been playing its part in terms of humanitarian aid, starting in 2013 when the government first sent financial aid to the Syrian people. Table 4 shows the amounts Qatar has contributed, starting in 2013 (Qcharity.org, n.d.). The decrease in the amount of financial aid may be attributed to political reasons and the shift in Qatar's priorities to concentrating on providing aid to rebels fighting against the incumbent Syrian regime. This decrease may also be as a result of more countries joining the effort to provide humanitarian aid to the Syrian population and may be a reflection of the lower gas and oil prices in 2016 and therefore lower overall income within the State of Qatar.

Table 4.

Qatari Financial Aid to Syria from 2013 to 2018 (Source: Qatar Charity Organization)

Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Amount	\$108.7 m	\$153.7m	\$105.3 m	\$44.1m	\$68.1m	\$41.7 m

Despite the fact that Western nations have been keen on the provision of aid to Syrian refugees, members of the GCC have also shown their support to refugees through the aid they dispense. Figure 11 below, for instance, shows various countries' contributions to the crisis in terms of accepting Syrian refugees into their borders. In spite

of these figures however, no consistent pattern can be seen, with the contributions fluctuating from one year to another. The data from the Financial Tracking Service do not indicate how much of Qatar's aid contribution went to Syria; hence the difficulty in establishing the exact extent to which Qatar has contributed to relief efforts in Syria based on the figures from the Financial Tracking Service. However, the efforts of some members of the GCC, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are well documented, as shown in Figure 11 below.




Figure 12: Countries at the forefront of humanitarian aid to Syria (Source: oxfam.org [accessed 4 February 2019]).

4.1.3. International Developments at Qatar Charity

The researcher had the chance to meet Mr. Mohammed Adrdor, an expert in humanitarian aid at Qatar Charity. During the meeting, Mr. Adrdor was very welcoming and helpful; he shared some data that included the financial aid that Qatar Charity sent to the Syrians in the refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey in 2017. He explained the role and partners of Qatar Charity. He also shared raw unpublished data in the form of Excel spreadsheets on the external financial support provided by Qatar Charity since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, implemented in collaboration with Qatar Charity's partners. These partners include United Nations agencies and NGOs supporting and relieving the neediest people in Syria. Aid is classified into five sectors, namely (1) food, (2) shelter and non-food items, (3) education, (4) health and (5) economic recovery and infrastructure. According to the spreadsheet data shared by Mr. Adrdor, the total amount of money that Qatar Charity had sent to Syria as aid in 2017 was \$73.17 million. Out of this, \$12.49 million went to education, and \$20.82 million went to emergency shelter and non-food items. Health took \$8.27 million; \$3.13 million went to water, sanitation and hygiene; and \$20.02 million was spent on food security. Mr. Adrdor further revealed that, compared with other years, the relief interventions by Qatar Charity in Syria were significantly higher, the main cause being an increase in the number of Syrians in need of help.

According to the Financial Tracking Services, the official figure for relief provided is approximately US\$4,352,437 (Fts.unocha.org, n.d.). This figure is in contrast to what Mr. Adrdor stated signifying that either not all donations were reflected by the

Financial Tracking Services or that the figures he portrayed were somewhat inflated. Nevertheless, both of these figures point to increased commitment on Qatar's part toward humanitarian assistance in Syria.

4.1.4. Qatar's Regional Position in Terms of Aid Contribution to Syria

From the available statistics, it is quite clear that Qatar has made a significant contribution to the relief effort in Syria. Reports indicate that Qatar is among the top five countries in the Middle Eastern region in terms of humanitarian aid contributions to Syria. Non-governmental organizations that are based in Qatar have consistently given aid to the people of Syria since 2011, with Qatar Charity being consistently ranked among the world's top NGO contributors to the relief efforts in Syria (Financial Tracking Service, 2018). Qatar's position as a significant aid contributor to Syria is further enhanced by the data provided by Qatar Charity, which shows that not only is aid to Syria being provided through government channels, but also by ordinary people throughout the world (Qcharity.org, n.d.).

Indirectly, Qatar has also shown its intentions of being a regional leader in terms of aid and donations by the level of commitment it portrays toward international humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations High Commission of Refugees (UNHCR). Figures released by the UNHCR showed that donations made by Qatar increased from US\$26,804,578 in 2017 to US\$50,819,476 (from both the government and private organizations) in 2018 (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). Notably, out of this figure, private organizations from Qatar contributed a significantly large amount at US\$42,232,172, as compared with the State of Qatar at

US\$8,587,304 (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). The contribution by private organizations from Qatar alone is ahead of most other countries in the region, with only Saudi Arabia beating this figure narrowly at US\$47,813,994 (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). Although this is not a direct manifestation of Qatar's aid to Syria, it shows the nation's commitment to humanitarian aid and donations, some of which is eventually channeled to Syria.

4.2 Chapter Summary

In a nutshell, the data collected showed a general increment in the aid that has been given to those affected by the Syrian crisis by the State of Qatar. The quantitative data collected from published data for instance, showed that by 2015, the State of Qatar had taken in 54,000 Syrian migrants, almost making up 2.2% of the overall population, and this number is expected to continue rising. However, this number does not reflect the accurate number of the forced Syrian migrants who received their visas after the Syrian Crisis. The collected data also shows that the aid provided to the Syrian Crisis by Qatar did not only entail the resettlement of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar but also came in the form of aid given to humanitarian causes both by governmental organizations and NGOs.

Chapter 5: Findings from the Interviews

The interviews revealed further details in addition to the statistical data on the number of Syrian forced migrants living in Qatar and the amount contributed by organizations and the Government of Qatar toward initiatives set up to help displaced Syrians. Thematic analysis of the interview transcripts and the notes where permission was not given to record the interviews, revealed a number of common threads in the narratives and provided a more detailed picture of the lives of displaced Syrians living in Qatar. The interview data were supplemented with observations of the Syrians' living conditions during the interviews.

5.1. The Syrian Community in Qatar

The interviews suggested that there is no specific "Syrian community" in Qatar. Only 3 out of the 10 interviewees lived in the same area. When asked about any gatherings or meetings they have with other Syrians, the interviewees tended to reply that they live apart and do not really share any cultural occasions with other Syrians in Qatar. In addition, although their housing is shared, mostly with other families (Algerian, Egyptian, and other nationalities), it was noticed that no Syrian families shared the same housing.

In addition, the experiences shared by the interviewees suggested that the Syrians do not receive any special treatment from the Qatari government, either positive or negative.

5.2. Route from Syria to Qatar

Each participant had a different story and different experience to tell, yet they almost all shared the same route that they took on their journey to Qatar. The answers to the first three interview questions showed that 7 out of the 10 participants followed the same route: they first entered Lebanon because of the shared land border with Syria, then traveled by air to Qatar. In the case of the two other interviewees, one had to go to Turkey first, then Qatar; the other went to Egypt first, then Qatar.

One participant and her family came from Damascus; the other nine participants were from two cities, which are known to be Sunni-majority cities (Aleppo and Homs), with six interviewees from Aleppo and three from Homs. All the participants from Aleppo had lost their houses and their jobs, and had moved to the countryside. These participants had applied for jobs in Qatar to get visas and leave in search of better working and conditions than what they had in their homeland.

5.3. Current Residency Status and Employment

Eight out of 10 participants had Qatari residency permits. The remaining two still had not obtained Qatari residency, mostly because of having a low income and not meeting residency requirements. However, since they had visiting visas, they were still in the country as of the time of the interview. The Syrians without residency will have to renew their visiting visas every 6 months at a cost of 250 QR per person. However,

according to the State of Qatar's immigration laws, they do not have to leave the country to do so, as the process is entirely facilitated by the Ministry of the Interior.

The Syrian forced migrants in Qatar tended to have different experiences that were largely associated with their residency status. The interview responses suggested that Syrians with official residency in Qatar have had, overall, positive experiences. The participant KA (55-year-old male) said, "I managed to work as an engineer in a big company in Qatar within 2 months since I came here in 2012; the payment is truly good which allowed me to bring my family to join me here. Me and my family love living in Qatar and see it as a second home." The interview participants who had residency permits did not seem to have been subjected to any abuse and mistreatment perpetrated by various governmental departments. For instance, their rights as official residents mean that they have the freedom to marry and intermingle with the rest of the people in Qatar. Syrians with residency are also able to secure the professional jobs available to other multinational and foreign workers. This implies that they were not likely to be affected by the poor working conditions that characterize the informal employment sectors, such as laborers, small private companies and street food vendors. For instance, according to an expose by *The Guardian*, most workers who lack residence permits and work visas in Qatar are subjected to inhumane working conditions such as low wages and deprivation of their passports and lack the freedom to switch jobs (Falconer, 2014). The workers most affected were from Philippines, Libya and, unsurprisingly, Syria. For these reasons, the Syrian forced migrants with residency in Qatar tended to describe their experiences as pleasant.

On the other hand, the Syrian forced migrants in Qatar who were still on visitor visas tended to share narratives describing unpleasant experiences. This is because they were mainly employed in the country's informal working sector, with the majority working at construction sites and on other government projects such as schools and World Cup venues (Connor, 2016). However, unlike their counterparts who have Qatari residency permits, Syrians on visitor visas described how they have constantly been subjected to poor working conditions. UO (32-year-old female) said: "Although I have a degree I cannot be hired without a residency; moreover, my husband works as a part-timer unofficially with a minimum salary that provides us with the essentials." According to the interviewees' narratives, those on visitor visas often face problems such as deteriorating health because of their constant exposure to poor work environments. In addition to this, they have also been subjected to harassment and discrimination in the form of underpayment for their services. This latter aspect has trapped these displaced Syrians in poverty.

5.4. Healthcare

All the eight interviewees who had Qatari residency enjoyed free healthcare, with one interviewee describing the Qatari healthcare system as "one of the best" and, overall, the Syrian migrants with residency indicated that they are satisfied with the healthcare provided by the Qatari Government. However, the Syrian forced migrants in Qatar on visitor visas have been subjected to higher healthcare costs. They have to pay 100% of their healthcare costs, which is exacerbated by how they are prone to ailments caused by or aggravated by working in dangerous or substandard working environments. It is

completely different for the other individuals with residency and/or a higher income, whose healthcare costs are usually subsidized and catered for through medical and health coverage. This is a reflection of the detrimental lifestyle that characterizes the experiences of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar on visit visas. However, in the case of an emergency the Qatari government provides all those who live in their lands with fast and good healthcare. Mrs. Asma, who is still without a residency permit, said, “My husband and I were walking on the seashore, when my husband suddenly fainted, so I called 999 and they sent an ambulance in less than 10 minutes and they took a good care of him until he was fine. They even offered to take him to the hospital or drive us home”.

5.5. Education

The Syrian forced migrants in Qatar have also found it difficult to access education. Even the interviewees with Qatari residency explained that they found the school fees and the lack of public universities to be a challenge for them. The interviewees who did not yet have residency are not allowed to enroll their children in any schools, either public or private, until they become permanent residents in Qatar. Only the Syrian Community School accepts the children of Syrians without residency for enrolment. However, this school is crowded and has no more room for all of the Syrian children, and no support from the Ministry of Education or the Charity Organizations has been provided to increase the number of classes (see Section 3.3.6). This is important, since this school is the only hope for those who do not have residency yet. To quote Mrs. Farida, “When we first arrived to Qatar, it was 2012. The Syrian school was not established yet and I had a 15-year-old son, who no other schools in Qatar accepted him

without residency. Thank God that we obtained the residency within 8 months.” Another side of the story from after the establishment of the Syrian Community School was provided by Mrs. Samah said, “My daughter is 7 years old and she wasn’t accepted in the Syrian Community School, where her two brothers go every day, due to huge capacity.”

It is as a result of this difficulty in accessing education, especially higher education, that many Syrian migrants and their families have not been able to acquire the qualifications needed for them to find jobs in the formal employment sector, where working conditions and pay are better. This phenomenon has been made even more difficult for those on visit visas because of overcrowding in the only existing learning facility for Syrian migrants. The Syrian school is now unable to enroll more migrant children because of the high number of students and the delay in approvals to hire more teachers from the Ministry of Education.

5.6. The Experiences of Three Syrian Women Living in Qatar

5.6.1. UmOmran

UmOmran is a housewife with three children, all of whom were born in Qatar (in 2011, 2014 and 2017). She entered Qatar on a visitor visa and her husband works in a small private company. She has been in the process of applying for residency since 2011 and she still does not have it. When I asked her how living without a residency permit impacted her life in Qatar, she described her life as follows:

I am partly living. My kids can't join any schools in Qatar; the only school that accepts Syrians with no residency is the Syrian School and that school has no more space to contain students.

She mentioned that they are paying for 100% of their medical care and that during her pregnancies as well as the birth of all three of her children, she had to pay around 5000 QR each time.

5.6.2. Sahmah

Samah is a 34-year-old Syrian woman who is married and has four children. She has been married for 13 years. Her husband entered Qatar in 2011, and she and her children spent 2 years in Syria waiting for the chance to join him. He works for a private company and does not have a stable income, which makes it hard to get a visa for his family. Two of her children study at the Syrian school, but her daughter was not accepted into the school because of the limited space for enrolment. Education is not provided to them and it is hard to find schools for their children. They pay 100% of their healthcare costs. On top of all this, she cannot find employment without first obtaining a residency permit. The family lives in Musaimer in two bedrooms that are part of a house that was divided among three families. Their living space is kept clean and tidy, but looks cramped for a family of six.

5.6.3. Asma

Asma is a Syrian from Hama who worked there as a teacher for 5 years. After the war started, her situation became very bad. Her home had no electricity and after the city came under military control, she was displaced to the countryside. In the countryside, they got by on using batteries to provide light and other amenities, and the water supply was scarce. In her experience as a teacher, the educational system was unstable and the schools would stop for up to 2 weeks at a time. In 2015, she became engaged to a Syrian

who had a job opportunity in Qatar and who managed to bring her to the country on a visitor visa. They got married and she obtained her residency in 7 months.

5.6.4 What the Experiences Mean

Based on the experiences of the three Syrian families outlined above, it is evident that the situation of most Syrian forced migrants in Qatar is not necessarily as ideal as would appear to be the case. Out of the three women involved in the study, two of them and their family members had received residence permits by the time of the interview. Another fact that became clear from the interviews is that the plight and quality of life of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar is significantly dependent on their immigration status. For example, all the three women interviewed tended to attribute their hardships to the lack of residence permits, which would essentially enable them to access the same services as those who have residency.

5.7 Chapter Summary

In a nutshell, this chapter discusses the findings from the data collected in the interviews. Based on the collected data, this chapter portrays a picture of Syrian forced migrants, each with a different story from the next. The first section, for instance, notes that there is no specific Syrian community in Qatar. The chapter also points out that despite the majority of Syrian residents possessing residence permits, those who do not possess such permits live a drastically different life with minimal benefits. In the last sections of the chapter, three women paint a grim picture of life for Syrian forced migrants without residency permits in Qatar.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1. Summary

This study started with a hypothesis assuming that regardless of not being a signatory member of the 1951 Convention on refugees, the State of Qatar continues to enhance the experiences of both Syrian forced migrants inside Qatar and Syrian refugees in the region through a diversity of humanitarian aid tools and initiatives.

Throughout the study, two variables were used to measure the accuracy of the hypothesis or to prove it wrong. Thus the main question of this research paper is “What efforts have been made by the State of Qatar to improve the situation of displaced Syrians since the crisis?” After asking the question, the two variables were used to answer the following sub-objectives that were extracted from the main research question:

- 1- Evaluating efforts that have been made by the Qatari Government to assist Syrian refugees that are displaced elsewhere by tracking the Qatari Government’s funding of humanitarian aid.
- 2- Evaluating Qatari efforts to address issues regarding Syrian forced migrants inside Qatar by studying migrants’ experiences.
- 3- Evaluating the experiences of Syrian migrants in relation to the Qatari Government. The data were collected through a qualitative research method including the analysis of interviews and secondary source data available through resources published online. The outputs of the collected data were analyzed to answer the research question.

The main finding of this study is that Qatar does welcome Syrians with visas, considering them as migrants. The Syrian forced migrants who entered Qatar after 2011 can be classified into two categories. The first category was Syrians with residency permits and the second group was those who still live in Qatar on visitor visas. Therefore, the experience of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar is determined by their visa status. In particular, migrants having residency in Qatar were not subjected to bad experiences in the country. However, migrants on visitor visas in Qatar were subjected to negative experiences such as poor working conditions, and restricted access to healthcare and education. Furthermore, the study established that the State of Qatar has made very little real effort to improve the situation of forced displaced Syrian migrants within Qatar after the Syrian crisis. These assertions are supported by information provided by humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty International, who have confirmed that there has been little progress made by Qatar in terms of improving Syrian migrant workers' rights. This is because many migrant workers have been limited to working in the country's informal employment sector, whereby they work in construction sites characterized by poor working conditions. Furthermore, this indicates that future research should focus on the different approaches that could be undertaken by humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty International to compel Qatar to improve the rights of migrant workers. For a more in-depth future study, it would be interesting to ascertain the number of Syrians located in Qatar on visitor or temporary visas. Although the data concerning domestic numbers of Syrian migrants are considered confidential now, maybe in future, this will not be the case. In addition, such data are important for researchers to suggest solutions

for displaced persons, since it can give evidence of accurate numbers of migrants in Qatar and how the government is going to deal with them in future. This is especially true, since it is not reasonable to leave their statuses pending waiting for them to go back to Syria, which might take decades or even never happen at all.

In response to the hypothesis statement therefore, Qatar has not succeeded in facilitating residency and applying social protection measures for displaced Syrians in the past 8 years within its borders. Although this might not be its own doing directly, factors such as being a non-signatory of the 1951 Convention play a major role in hindering Qatar's efforts. This is portrayed in the discrepancy between the aid Qatar donates to the international community and that which it commits to Syria and its population directly. On the other hand, although Qatar has largely failed at the rehabilitation of refugees within its borders, it has largely been successful in its efforts to ensure the facilitation and social protection of Syrian refugees outside its borders. In addition, there is transparency in the numbers when it comes to figures outside Qatar, such as Qatari contributions in the form of financial aid. Qatar should be proud of this contribution; however, when it comes to domestic figures, like the number of Syrians who entered Qatar after the Syrian Crisis in 2011, and financial help including health care and education, this information is not published.

However, the only published figure of the number of Syrians was announced only once in an interview, which is not a very reliable source of data and, in fact, does not reflect an accurate number, since it matches the number of all the Syrians in Qatar even before the Crisis in 2011. However, the Emir of Qatar recently has announced in

September 2018 that Asylum Seekers' Law Number 11 will be implemented, which is a promising step that might lead to accepting refugees as a legal category in future. In addition, the nature of the Qatari regime might have contributed towards not being very welcoming to a politically active group of migrants who might bring instability to the country, these Syrians are considered to be rebels. It is also common among Muslim societies, such as Qatari society, to establish *jihadi* groups if the elements of *jihad* applies, which, in the Syrians' case, does apply.

6.2. Limitations of Research

Throughout the research, I was unable to use official data from the different government ministries. This is because these data were kept confidential by the separate ministries, and I was not able to interview Qatari policymakers during the time of writing the thesis. Similarly, I did not manage to obtain precise published data concerning Qatar or the GCC with respect to the issue of Syrian migrants. In addition to this, the sample size was small and many Syrians were afraid of participating in the interviews, thus forcing me to write notes instead of recording interviews. This concern also limited the ways in which I was able to reproduce exact quotes from interviews.

6.3. Implications for Policymakers

On the basis of the study findings, policymakers are recommended to look for appropriate alternatives to improve the lives of forced Syrian migrants in Qatar. Along with that, the government might reconsider signing the 1951 Refugee Convention; since it is never too late to take such a huge step, especially with the State of Qatar's potential

to be one of the richest developed countries in the Middle East. In addition, policymakers could explore ways of providing better access to education and healthcare for the forced Syrian migrants in Qatar, given that majority of public schools are crowded and do not have enough resources to accommodate the increasing number of Syrian migrants living in Qatar. One way to do this would be to mobilize more resources in terms of human resources as well as monetary aid to the cause of settling forced Syrian migrants in Qatar.

Policymakers should also step up aid efforts in mitigating the Syrian refugee crisis outside Qatar's borders. There are a number of ways to do this directly as follows:

- I. Increase in financial aid to the UNHCR's docket in charge of Syria.
- II. Better cooperation with the international organizations regarding the provision of logistical support, including non-monetary items such as food.
- III. Coming up with new measures that will essentially promote the admission, settlement and rehabilitation of Syrian refugees within the State of Qatar.
- IV. Suggesting and insisting that the State of Qatar starts the process of becoming a signatory member of both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. This will go a long way in ensuring that Qatar plays an active and visible role in the facilitation of refugees within the region, including those from Syria.

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Appendix A: Interview Questions

I am Asma Almarri, a Master Students in the Gulf Studies Program, Qatar University. These interview questions are aimed at providing first-hand information about the experiences of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar. The information gathered from the interviews will be used in filling research gaps for the purposes of an MA research study entitled “The Efforts Made by the State of Qatar to improve the Situation of Displaced Syrians after the Syrian Crisis: A Case Study of the Experience of Syrian Migrants in Qatar”.

The interviews will be conducted randomly using a snowball sample of around 10–15 Syrians who have been living in Qatar since the Arab Spring.

The following interview questions will be asked:

- Tell me a little about yourself: Your name, age, marital status and what part of Syria you come from.
- Can you tell me about your experiences in Syria before you came to Qatar?
- Tell me a little about your journey from Syria to Qatar and how you got your visa. How did you come to know about Qatar before you came here and how did you get here?
- Where in Qatar do you live and what has your experience been like living here?
- What do you do for a living where you stay?
- Did you come alone or were there other Syrians you came with? Where do they live and what do most of them do for a living?

- Tell me about your plans for the future. Do you plan to stay in Qatar or do you hope to return to Syria one day?